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SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.
COURT OF ERIROBS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEYA

ABATEMENT.

Proceeding on Guardian'sdeath.-A proceeding in the County Court
against a guardian to compel him to account, is not a suit either at law
or in equity, and abates on the death of the guardian : Harvey v. Harvey,
87 Ills.
AssuMPSIT.

Payment when recoverable back-When the assignee of a purchaser
of land, who has contracted to sell the land to another, who demands
to see his deed therefor, is compelled to pay the original vendor more
than is due him, in order to get a deed to satisfy his vendee, and the
payment is made under protest, it is a fair question of fact for the jury
whether the payment is not involuntary, and made under a sort of moral
duress, and if so the excess above the real sum due may be recovered
back in assumpsit under the common counts: Pemberton v. Wfliarms,
87 Ills.
ATTORNEY. See Conflict of Laws; Damages.
BANK.

ip.
See Corporation;Fartnersh
BANKRUPTCY.

Claim for Captured or Abandoned Property-Act of Congress of
1853.-A claim against the government for the proceeds of cotton
belonging to a bankrupt, captured by the military forces of the United
States and sold, and the proceeds paid into the treasury, constitutes
property, and passes to his assignee in bankruptcy, though from the bar
of the statute, the claim be not enforceable in the Court of Claims or
by any legal proceedings: F-win v. The United States, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1878.
The Act of Congress of February 26th 1853, to prevent frauds upon
the treasury of the United States, applies only to cases of voluntary
assignment of demands against the government. It does not embrace
cases where there has been a transfer of title by operation of law. The
passing of claims to heirs, devisees or assignees in bankruptcy is not
within the evil at which the act aimed: Id.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during October Term 1878. The cases will probably be reported in 7 or 8 Otto.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 87 Illinois Reports.
3 From John S. Runnells, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 47 Iowa Reports.
4 From T. K. Skinker, :Esq., Reporter; to appear in 67 Missouri Reports.
4 From John H. Stewart, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 30 N..J. Eq. Reports.
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Evi(dnce-Assinee's Deed-It is not required that a complete transcript of the record and files shall be given in evidence to support the
deed of an assignee in bankruptcy. A certified copy of the order
decreeing bankruptcy and appointing the assignee, is sufficient under
the Act of Congress. All such deeds, reciting the decree in bankruptcy
and the assignee's appointment, supported by a certified copy of such
decree, are made full and complete evidence both of the bankruptcy
and the assignment, and supersede the necessity of any other proof to
validate such deeds: Heath v. .Hyde, 87 Ills.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Delivery of Note to Jlfakr.-The delivery of a note by- the holder to
the maker, with intent thereby to discharge the debt, does discharge it:
Vanderbeck v. Vanderbeck, 30 N. J. Eq.
COMMON C RRIF.

Passengerno right to sell Goods.-A party cannot maintain an action
against the captain of a boat for preventing her from selling her goods
on his boat on an excursion, she having obtained no permission for that
purpose; nor can she recover when the captain put her goods into the
baggage-room, and could not deliver them to her, owing to the crowd
getting off the boat until it was too late for her to get them conveyed to
the grounds of a picnic where she expected to make sales : S-mallman
v. Whiter, 87 Ills.
CONFLICT OF LAWs. See Interest.
Confession of Judgment by Attorney pertains to Remedy- Confession
of cannot be made by Attorney.-A confession of judgment pextains
to the remedy, and is therefore governed, by the law of Iowa. A contract made in another state authorizing a confession to be made by an
attorney will not be enforced there : Hamilton v. Shoenberqer,47 Iowa.
CONFUSION oF GOODS.

Party Caueing it to bear Loss.-If a party having charge of the property of others, so confounds it with his own that the line of distinction
cannot be traced, all the inconvenience of the confusion is thrown upon
the party who produced it, and it is for him to distinguish his own property or lose it: Jewett v. Dringer,30 N. J. Eq.
A junk dealer, by fraudulent collusion with the employees of a railroad corporation, obtained large quantities of old iron, &c., at much less
than the actual veigbt or value. On delivery it was thrown indiscriminately on other heaps of old iron, &c., belonging to him, so as to be indistinguishsble. Held, that he must forfeit the whole mass to the company: Id.
CONTRACT.
CORPORATION.

See Equity.
See Receiver.

Stockholder of Bank-Liability to Credtors.-]Underthe charter of
the bank of Chicago, which provided that "each stockholder shall be
liable to double the amount of stock held or owned by him, and for
three months after giving notice of transfer, &c. it was held, that a
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stockholder assumed a primary liability to creditors of the bank, to an
amount double his stock, and not a secondary one; and having incurred
such liability, he was not released therefrom by his not being sued
within three months after a transfer of his stock: Fullerv. Ledden,
87 Ills.
COVENANT.
See Vendor.
CRIMINAL LAw.

Defendant as Witness-Liability to .1mveachment.-When a defendant in a criminal case testifies in his own behalf, the state may impeach
his character before he offers any evidence that it is good ; his testimony is subject to the same rules and tests as that of any other witness: S tate v. Cox, 67 1o.
In Iipeaching a witness, evidence of his reputation for general moral
character, as well as of that for truth and veracity, is admissible; but
before permitting witnesses to testify as to such reputation, they must
shbw that they are acquainted with it : Id.
If a defendant in a criminal case becomes a witness in his own behalf,
as permitted by the Act of April 18th 1877, he thereby subjects himself
to the same rules as to cross-examination and impeachment as other
witnesses: State v. Clinton, 67 Mo.
CUSTOM.

Dealings withL Reference to .Partiuaar.Aarets.-A person who deals
in a particular market must be taken to deal according to the known,
general and uniform custom or usage of that market, and he who employs
another to act for him at a particular place or mirket, must be taken
as intending that the business will be done according to the custom and
usage of that place or market, whether the principal in fact knew of the
usage or custom, or not: Bailey v. Bensley, 87 Ills.
DAMAGES.

Attorney's Fees-In an action for breach of covenant of warranty the
grantee may recover taxable costs, but before he can recover his attorney's fees he must show that he has paid, or is under obligation to pay,
some specified sum. He cannot recover what he may show are reasonable fees without proof that he has incurred liability to that extent:
,Swartz v. Ballou, 47 Iowa.
Contractfor Personal Service-Breach-Ifan employee who is under
contract to serve his employer for a fixed period leaves the service before
the expiration thereof, he is not entitled to recover what may be his due
after deducting damages for the breach of contract until the time of
payment fixed therein: Powers v. Wilson, 47 Iowa.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. -

Fraudulent Conveyance.-An administrator of an estate, under an
order of court, cannot sell and convey any interest in lands sold and
conveyed by his intestate in his lifetime to defraud his creditors. If he
does so sell and convey, his grantee cannot naintain a bill to avoid the
fraudulent conveyance, because no title passes, fbr want of power in
the administrator: Beebe v. Saulter, 87 Ills.
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DEED.

JfMistake-Equity-Subseguent Grantee with Notice.-A mortgagor

intended to give, and the mortgagee expected to receive, a mortgage in
fee, but, for want of words of inheritance, the mortgage, as executed,
conveyed only an estate for life. A second mortgagee had such actual
notice of the first mortgage as induced the belief that it was a mortgage
of the fee, and, so believing, took the second mortgage. field, that, as
against the second mortgagee, the first mortgage should be regarded as
a mortgage of the fee: Gale v. Norris, 30 N. J. Eq.
DuREsS.

See Assumpsit.
EQUITY.

Paud-Practice-Parties.-Adeed to purchasers under a judgment

and sale made by an auditor in attachment, cannot be avoided on the
ground of false claims by creditors, and an irregular, fraudulent and
inadequate sale, without making the creditors and auditor parties:
Wson v. Bellows, 30 N. J. Eq

This defect, in not joining proper parties, is good ground for demurrer, where it appears on the face of the bill : Id.
When the purchasers are not charged with fraud, relief against them
will only be granted on equitable terms; such as offering to refund the
purchase-money. They will not be compelled to look to others who are
not parties to the bill : Id.
Indisensable Party to S'uit.-K., a citizen of Tennessee, filed a bill'
in the Circuit Court against D., a citizen of Ohio. The controversy
related to one hundred and eighty-four shares of the stock of the Memphis Gas-Light Company, which company was not made a party to the
suit. The substance of the bill was, that plaintiff was the owner of the
shares of the gas company stock already mentioned, and that while he
so owned and held the stock, and during the late civil war, the defend.
ant "1obtained possession of the books and control of the offices of the
company, and being so in possession and control, wrongfully and fraudulently procured and obtained to be made a transfer upon the books of
the company to his own name as owner, and from the name of your
orator, the said one hundred and eighty-four shares of stock, and the
issuance to him of a certificate of said stock, and the cancellation of the
certificate of his stock belonging to and in the name of your orator."
The relief prayed was that the said capital stock might be restored to
the plaintiff, and that said D. might be compelled to cause and authorize
the transfer of said stock to be made on the books of the company to
the plaintiff, and might be enjoined from making, or authorizing to be
made, a transfer of any of the stock to any other person : Hekl, that
the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, because the gaslight company was an indispensable party to the relief sought in the
bill, or to any relief which a court of equity could give : .Kendig v.
Dean, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
Mistake-RectificationoIf Contract.-Where an oral contract is afterwards reduced to writing, and the writing fails to express in apt and
proper terms the real intention of the parties through a mistake of the
VOL. XXVII.-'
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draftsman, equity will permit the mistake to be corrected: Nowlin v.
Pync, 47 Iowa.
Practice-Demurrerto Bill.-When there is a demurrer to the whole
bill, and also to part, and the latter only is sustained, the regular decree
is to dismiss so much of the bill as seeks relief in reference to the mat.
ters adjudged bad, and to overrule the demurrer to the residue, and
direct the defendant to answer thereto: Giant Powder Co. v. Califor.
na Powder Works, S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1878.
Action by United States-Attorney General- Chancery Jurisdction
to grant Belief on the ground of Fraud.-It is essential to a bill in
chancery on behalf of the government to set aside a patent, or a confirmation of land title under a Mexican grant, after it has become final,
that it shall appear in some way, without regard to the special form
that the attorney general has brought it himself, or given such authority
for it as will make him officially responsible, and show his control of
the cause through all stages of its presentation: The United States v.
Tkirockmorton et al., S. O. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
The frauds for which a bill in chancery will be sustained to set aside
a judgment or decree between the same parties, rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, are frauds extrinsic or collateral to the matter
tried by the first court, and not a fraud, which was in issue in that suit:
-d.The cases in which such relief has been granted are those in which,
by fraud or deception practised on the unsuccessful party, he has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by reason of which there has
never been a real contest before the court of the-subject-matter of the
suit : Id.
E I ENcE. See CriminalLaw.
Person not heard from for Seven Years-Presumption.-A person
shown not to have been heard of for seven years by those (if any) who,
if he had been alive, would naturally have beard of him, is presumed
to be dead, unless the circumstances of the case are such as to account
for his not being heard of without assuming his death: Davie et al. v.
Briggs, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1878.
But that presumption is not conclusive, nor is it to be rigidly observed
without regard to accompanying circumstances which may show that
death in fact occurred within the seven years: Id.
If it appears in evidence that the absent person, within the seven
years, encountered some specific peril, or within that period came within
the range of some impending or immediate danger, which might reasonably be expected to destroy life, the court or jury may infer that life
ceased before the expiration of the seven years: Id.
Where a party has been absent seven years, without having been
heard of, the only presumption arising is that he is then dead, there is
none as to the time of his death: Id.
Proofof Handwriting.-When the genuineness of a written instrument is the subject of investigation, it is.not competent to prove the
execution of other papers having no connection with the case, and then,
by the testimony of experts, who have compared them with the instru-
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ment in question, to show that the latter is a forgery: State v. Clinton,
67 Mo.
EXECUTOR. See Usury.
FRAUD. See Equity.

Sham Bid.-If one, by fraud procures a sham bid on his property,
when offered for sale, by an irresponsible person, and thereby succeeds in
having the land of another sold to pay off a portion of the debt he is
equitably bound to pay, such injured party may recover back the sum
so lost by him in the sale of his property, or the sum realized by the
other, with interest: Darst v. lhomas, 87 Ills.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Orinal or Collateral Undertaking-An original undertaking to

retain attorneys to attend to a suit for a third person may be implied
from circumstances, but one collateral to answer for the debt of another
cannot, as it must be in writing. Whether a party's undertaking is
original or merely collateral, is a question of fact for the jury : .Mashier
V. Kitchel & Arnold, 87 Ills.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

Sile of Goods- Change of Possession.-The actual and continued

change of possession, contemplated by the statute in relation to fraudulent conveyances (1 W. S. p. 281, § 10), must be open, notorious and
unequivocal--such as to apprise the community, or those accustomed to
deal with the vendor, that the goods sold have changed hands, and that
the title has passed from the vendor to the vendee (following Caflin v.
Ro.yburg, 42 Mo. 439, and other cases) : Wright v. M Cormick, 67
Mo.

If the purchaser of a stock of goods permits them to remain at the
vendor's place of business, without removing his business sign, the
change of possession is not unequivocal within the meaning of the foregoing rule, notwithstanding it may appear that when the sale was made,
the purchaser, in the presence and with the consent of the vendor, notified the vendor's clerks of the fact and told them that in dealing with
the goods in the future they were to act for him, and that the vendor
was to have no further control over them, and that he did not, in fact,
exercise any farther control with the purchaser's consent.
HiGnWAY.

Dedieation-Proofof Intent.-To show that title is acquired to

land for a public'road by dedication, the proof should be very satisfactory, either of an actual intention to dedicate, or of such acts and
declarations, as should equitably stop the owner from denying such
intention: Kyle v. Town of Logan, 87 Ills.
HUSBAND

AND WIFE.

Residene-Divorce.-In law the domicile of the husband is that of
his wife, and her residence follows that of the husband. When a
husband acquires a new home it is the duty of his wife to go with him,
and if she refuses, without justification, for two years, the husband will
be entitled to a divorce: Kennedy v. Kennedy, 87 Ills.
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INSOLVENT.

Preferenceof Debt to State.-New Jersey does not possess the crown's
common law prerogative to have its debts paid in preference to the debts
of other creditors; Board of Freeholders of .Middlesex Co. v. State
Bank, 30 N. J. Eq.
INSURANCE.

Statements of Soliciting Agent-Notice to Agent-Such Agent acts

for Company, not for insured.-Parol evidence is admissible to show
that the assured stated to the solicitor of the insurance company who
received the application the fact that there was an encumbrance upon
the property insured: Boetcher v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 47 Iowa.

Notice to a soliciting agent, who is authorized to fill up applications
for the assured, to receive premiums and forward the same with the
application to the company, and whose agency thereupon ceases, is
notice to the company: Id.
A policy of insurance expressly stipulated that the soliciting agent
who took the application was the agent of the assured; the latter was
not advised of the fact at the time of the negotiation, when the application was signed and the premium paid; the policy further provided
that the insurance might be terminated at the option of the company:
Beld, that the assured had the right to believe the soliciting agent was
the agent of the company, and the insertion of the clause in the policy
providing that he was the agent of the assured constituted a fraud upon
the latter, of which the company could not take advantage: Id.
Notice of Loss.-Where a policy of insuranc6 required immediate
notice to be given by the assured in case of a loss, and in the great fire
in Chicago on October 9th 1871, the plaintiff's property insured was
burned, notice of the loss given November 13th 1871, was held to have
been given in sufficient time, in view of the great derangement in all
kinds of business caused by the fie : Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Mc Ginnis, 87 Ills.
INTEREST.
Conflict of L;aws-LTex Loci-Diferent Rates of Interest.-Where

bonds were executed in New York and made payable there, it was held
that delinquent interest thereon drew interest at the rate of six per
cent. Following Preston v. Walker, 26 Iowa 205: Burrows v. Stryker,
47 Iowa.
A decree will draw only the rate of interest of the debt, and if a part
of the debts drew one rate of interest and a part another, the decree will
in like manner draw different rates of interest: Id.
JUDGMENT.

Judgment by Cnfession.-When a judgment by confession under a
warrant of attorney is opened, and the defendant allowed to plead a
defence, the court has no right to require the defendant to bring into

court the sum supposed to be due, as a condition to opening the case.
The judgment may be allowed to stand as a security for the condition,
till after the trial of the issues tendered on the defence: Page v. Wallace, 87 Ills.
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LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

New Parties-Subrogation.-Theadministrator of a deceased sheriff
having sued upon a note given to his intestate for the purchase-money
of land sold by him under a decree of court, the sureties of the deceased,
who had been compelled to pay to the parties entitled the amount for
which the land sold, claiming the right to be subrogated in place of the
administrator, caused themselves to be substituted as plaintiffs in the
action more than ten years after the maturity of the note. -Held,that
as they virtually commenced a new action-one in equity, instead of the
action at law upon the note-they were barred by the Statute of Limitations, although the action, as originally brought, was not barred:
Sweet v. Jeffries, 67 Mo.
MdRTGAGE.

See Deed.

NEW TRIAL.

"When Chancery wi grant a New Trial at 1aw.-Where a plaintiff's
attorney brings a case on for trial in the absence and without the knowledge of the defendant and his attorney, in violation of a written stipulation to give ten days' previous notice of an intention to try the ease,
a court of equity will grant a new trial, if it appears that the judgment
is unjust, and this though relief may be had at law by motion to set
aside the judgment: Foote v.. Despain, 87 Ills.
PARTNERSHIP.

improper Payment of PartnershipFunds.-If a bank. pays out the
money of-a partnership, to one of the partners upon his check, in fraud
of the rights of the other partners, an action at law cannot be maintained in the firm name against the bank, but a resort must be had to a
court of equity for the relief of those partners claiming to be injured:
Church v. Kart Nat. Bank of Chicago, 87 Ills.
PAYMENT. See Assumysit.
Mistake in.-In the case of the sale of milk by the can, if by mistake
of the parties the milk delivered is short of the quantity intended,
owing to the cans not holding the amount supposed, and the vendor
receives more money on that account than he is entitled to, he must
account for the same, even though the purchaser was negligent in discovering the mistake: Devine v. Edwards, 87 Ills.
PATENT.

Re-issue-Hfust befor same Invention.-A re-issued patent must be for
the same itivention as that which formed the subject of the original
patent, or for a part thereof, when divisional re-issues are granted. It
must not contain anything substantially new or different: Giant
Powder Co. v. CaliorniaPowder Works, S. (. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
An original patent for a process will not support a re-issued patent for
a composition, unless the composition is the result of the process, and
the invention of the one involves the invention of the other: Id.
A patent granted for certain processes of exploding nitro-glycerine
will not support a re-issue for a composition of nitro-glycerine and gun-
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powder or other substances, even though the original application claimed
the invention of both process and compound. They are distinct inventions: Id.
PREsumpIoN. See Evidence.
PROHIBITION.

Writ does not lie to arrest a proceeding at law for defect of parties,
as when a suit which should be brought in the name of the state is
brought in the name of private persons: Bowman's Case, 67 Mo.
RAILROADS.
Rights of Passengersas to T'ckets-Payment of Fare-PuttinyPassengers off for Nonpayment.-The purchase of a ticket constitutes a
contract between the company and passenger, in accordance with which
the former undertakes to carry the latter to his destination on the particular train he takes and no other, unless he is permitted by some
regulation of the company, upon compliance with some condition, to
stop over at an intervening station and resume his journey by another
train. The contract for the transportation of the passenger is an
entirety, and if without the consent of the company he stops before
reaching his destination, he cannot again impose the obligation of the
contract upon the company by insisting that he shall be carried the
remainder of the journey: Stone v. C. & N. TV. Railroad C., 47
Iowa.
A passenger who refuses to pay his fare becomes a trespasser, n6t
entitled to the rights and privileges of a passenger, and may rightfully
be ejected from the train by an employee of the company: Id.
By refusal to pay his fare the passenger deprives himself of the right
to insist upon courteous treatment from the company's employees and
cannot complain of their misconduct : Id.
The cause of action being a breach of contract to carry, the passenger cannot be permitted to show that he was ejected from the train with
insult and abuse, or that the conductor was intoxicated : Id.
Testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had been permitted at other
times to stop over at intervening stations, and ride upon subsequent trains,
with the same ticket, and without "stop-over" checks, was held inadmissible : Id.
Where a passenger has been ejected from a train for non.payment of
fare, he must pay the fare from the station where he first entered the
train before 'he can insist upon being carried forward upon the same
train, and if he purchase a ticket at the point where he was ejected, the
conductor may nevertheless exclude him from the train: Id.
That the passenger attempted to re-enter the train with good intent
and without a purpose to defraud the company would not aid him to a
recovery: Id.
RECEIVER.
T'tle.-On the appointment of a receiver of an insolvent corporation,
its title to its property is divested by force of law: Board of Chosen
Freeholders of Middlesex County v. State Bank, 30 N. J. Eq.
When his Title Accrues-The title of a receiver to the property
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which is the subject of the receivership, attaches from the date of the
order of court appointing him; it is not deferred until he gives bond in
compliance with the order: Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo.
SERVANT.

M!UGLING.

See Damages.

See Statute.

STATUTE.

In Derogationof Common Law.-Statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be so construed as not to infringe upon the rules or princi.
ples of the common law to any greater extent than is plainly expressed:
State v. CYnton, 67 Mo.
Repeal by subsequent Act is Judicial not Legislative Question-Acts
of Congress against Smuggling.-An action of debt cannot be maintained at the suit of the United States to recover the penalties prescribed by the fourth section of the Act of Congress, approved July
18th 1866, entitled "An Act to prevent smuggling, and for other

purposes." That act contemplated a criminal proceeding, and not a
civil remedy: Plhe United States v. Claftin et al., S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term, 1878.
Nor does section 3082 of the Revised Statutes authorize a civil
action : Id.
A recital in a statute that a former statute had been repealed or
superseded by subsequent acts, is not conclusive that such a repeal or
supersedure had been made. Whether a statute was repealed by a
later one is a judicial not a legislative question : Id.
When a new statute covers the whole subject-matter of an old one,
adds offences, varying the procedure, the latter operates by way of
substitution, and not cumulatively. The former is, therefore, impliedly
repealed. It is, however, necessary to the implication of a repeal that
the objects of the two statutes are the same, in the absence of any
repealing clause. If they are not, both statutes will stand, though they
refer to the same subject: Id.
TROVER.

Eect of Judgment on, Title-Former Application-Damages.-A
judgment in trover, without satisfaction, does not pass the title of the
property to the defendant: Atwater v. Tupper, 45 Conn.
The plaintiff brought two actions of trover at the same time against
A. and B., who had severally converted the same property, the conversion by B. being after that by A. He obtained judgment against A.,
when B. pleaded that fact in bar of the further maintenance of the
action, the judgment not having been satisfied. 11eld to be no bar:
Id.
And held, that the judgment was to be for the full value of the property: Id.
The value of the property had been found upon a hearing on the
general issue before the filing of the plea in bar of the further maintenance of the action. The plaintiff demurred to that plea and the court
sustained the demurrer. The defendant then claimed the right to be
heard upon the question of damages. Held, that, as the value of the
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property had been already found, and was the rule of damages, the
defendant was not entitled to a further bearing on the subject: Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
of lndiv'idual Debt-Acceptance by
Settlement
by
Trust
of
Breach
Cestui que Trust.-Alhough a trustee has no right to settle a debt due
to him as trustee by merely cancelling one due from himself in his
individual capacity to the debtor, yet if the cestui que trust adopts the settlement and compels the sureties of the trustee to make good the amount
to him, they cannot afterward recover it of the original debtor: Sweet
v. Jeffries, 67 Mo.
A sheriff sold land under a decree for partition and received a note
for the purchase-money. Becoming indebted to the purchaser, he
agreed that his debt should be set off against the note, and accordingly
executed a deed for the land without collecting the note. The parties
entitled to the proceeds of the partition sale sued him and his sureties,
alleging that the note had been paid. There was a recovery in this
action and the sureties paid the judgment. In an action by them
against the maker of the note. Held, that the settlement made by the
sheriff, though originally unauthorized, had been adopted by the parties
in interest and had thereby become binding upon the sureties.
USURY.
By one of two Executors is Good Defence.-One of two executors
loaned moneys of the estate on bond and mortgage, reserving usury
thereon and appropriating it to his own use. On foreclosure by the
executors on behalf of the estate,-Held, that such usury could be set
up as a defence: 0 Neil v. Ceveland, 30,N. J. Eq.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Lien for Purchase-money-l-Warraty-Eviction.-Upona bill to
enforce a lien for the purchase-money, and where there has been no
fraud and no eviction, actual or constructive, the vendee, or a party in
possession under him, cannot controvert the title of the vendor, and no
one claiming an adverse title can be permitted to bring it forward and
have it settled in that suit. Such a bill would be multifarious, and
there would be a misjoinder of parties: Peters v. Bowman, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1878.
In such cases, the vendee and those claiming under him must rely
upon the covenants of title in the deed of the vendor. They measure
the right and the remedy of the vendee, and if there are no such
covenants, in the absence of fraud he can have no redress: Id.
Where at the time of the conveyance with warranty, there is adverse
possession under a paramount title, such possession is regarded as eviction and involves abreach of this covenant. Where the paramount title
is in the warrantor, and the adverse possession -is tortious, there is no
eviction, actual or constructive, and no action will lie: Id.
The covenant of good right to convey is synonymous with the covenant of seizin. The actual seizin of the grantor will support both,
irrespective of his having an indefeasible title : .d.
These covenants, if broken at all, are broken when they are made.
They are personal, and do not run with the land: Id. -

